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Abstract: Western scientific communities have, for the past few decades, been overly 
concerned with ensuring that social - including educational - research is conducted to the 
highest ‘ethical’ standard (Hammersley, 2010). The exact meaning of the word remains 
contested, as does the question of whether insisting too much upon ethical rules and 
regulations perhaps harms the quality and freedom of the scientific endeavour. In this 
article, I reflect on the main arguments in this on-going debate, with the particular accent 
on ethics and power relationships in elite research, often neglected in such discussions. 
I conclude by noting that, whatever one’s stance, what is necessary, to advance both the 
debate and the quality of one’s research, is a greater concern with the theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings of adopted positions.
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Introduction
Prior to my commencing the interview-based fieldwork within my PhD project 
centred on the development of a Serbian education policy, my intended meth-
odology was to receive clearance from the University’s Ethics Committee. Once 
in the field, I had to offer my respondents an ‘informed consent’ form, approved 
by said Committee, for them to sign and thus vouchsafe that they are voluntarily 
agreeing to participate in my research, and that they are aware of their various 
rights, such as the right to anonymity, confidentiality, or the abandonment of 
the project together with data we have produced. Some of the informants were 
intrigued and wished to know more about procedures for ensuring the ethical 
character of research at our university. Others signed without so much as skim-
ming the document, safe in the belief that they shall be treated fairly, and that the 
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form was mere bureaucratic nuisance to get out of the way. Some, still, sceptically 
raised the issue of the apparent artifice of insisting upon ethics of social research 
whilst neglecting ethics of conduct in other areas, such as public policy, or foreign 
affairs.
I, for my part, wondered about what was really guaranteed with these 
forms, and why they did not seem to resolve any of the numerous ethical issues 
- of (dis)honesty, allegiance, worthiness, usefulness and purpose, to name a few - 
that I have personally been experiencing at various points throughout the course 
of my project. It became impossible not to reflect on Hammersley’s (2010) recent 
observation that these procedures have likely been put in place not to help solve 
such complex issues, but to make it easier to locate the blame in event of some-
thing going wrong. This, he claims, is indicative of an ideology of accountability, 
in large - or globalising - societies, in which it is safer to reach for bureaucratic 
mechanisms, than it is to trust the people’s (researchers’) sensible and professional 
judgement.
This is just one of the positions on the matter which I will discuss here, 
drawing on my own experience as an emerging social researcher as much as on 
the current academic debates. It is necessary to qualify my focusing on ethical is-
sues encountered particularly with qualitative methods, by noting that I am writ-
ing from the perspective of my own epistemology, which is one of critical real-
ism married with discourse theory (see for example Fairclough, 2006). Although 
some of the ethical issues I touch upon are universal, and can be encountered in 
quantitative methodology as well as qualitative, most of them are more common 
in the latter, with its, as Punch (2005) notes, arguably greater intrusion into peo-
ple’s private lives and intimate thoughts.
The development of ethical regulations and  
common ethical issues they tackle
Some authors date the increased awareness and preoccupation with research eth-
ics as far back as Nuremberg Trials and the atrocities committed in the WW2 in 
the name of science (Dingwall, 2008). In discussing the extension of various ethi-
cal norms to social science, Milgram’s study of obedience and Humphrey’s covert 
observations of the ‘tearoom trade’, both conducted in the 1960s, have become 
the unavoidable textbook examples of ‘unethical’ scientific behaviour. However, 
despite the fact that a social science project nowadays does not usually carry such 
a risk to the participants’ wellbeing as these famous cases, the Western research 
community has gone through great lengths to establish various ethical regula-
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tions and appropriate ethical boards to ensure that these regulations are being ad-
hered to. Unfortunately, receiving an ethics committee’s stamp of approval does 
not solve most of the problems routinely faced by researchers throughout their 
project, and, as various authors point out, aiming to tick those boxes and satisfy 
those criteria can actually hamper the access to valuable data and the production 
of valuable knowledge (Hammersley, 2008; 2010; Dingwall, 2008; Hammersley 
and Traianou, 2011).
The most common ethical issues considered in social science research are 
those of anonymity and confidentiality of the data, cost/benefit and reciproc-
ity for both the researcher and the researched, deception or making sure that 
participants are giving their ‘informed’ consent to being studied, the researcher’s 
allegiance and loyalty to multiple groups (participants, general public, research 
community, sponsor if there is one), and various conflicts of interest that arise 
when these do not coincide - which they almost never do. There are a number 
of problems that can occur with regards to any of them - during the course of 
research, for example, some information might be revealed which the researcher 
feels should be made public, thus breaching the anonymity/confidentiality rule. 
Then there is the relationship of reciprocity between the scientists and their sub-
jects, closely tied with the balance of power between them, which is an ideal to 
work towards, rather than an achievable state, and is something which is rarely 
made explicit and actively incorporated in data collection and analysis. ‘Informed 
consent’ is a debatable term at best, especially when dealing with vulnerable 
groups, or when a concern for richer and more useful data results in a conscious 
withholding of information about the full extent of the research. In addition, 
there are situations when it would be nigh on impossible to obtain informed con-
sent in the first place - for example when observing social behaviour in a public 
place, or when studying content available through social networks and internet 
forum boards. Finally, there are various political issues implicit in ownership of 
data, and the publication and use of research findings (Dingwall, 2008).
The most commonly raised issue is the treatment of data in terms of its 
anonymity and confidentiality, and the default position here is for the data to 
be kept anonymous – in fact, this is usually supposed to be guaranteed by the 
informed consent forms. Most research handbooks stress these rights to anonym-
ity and confidentiality as a given, and something to be adhered to at all costs. 
However, not only do researchers rarely discuss the difficulties that can often arise 
from the attempt to keep anonymity and confidentiality at all times, they almost 
never scratch the surface of the problematic implications of keeping them as the 
default in social science research. This is a case of balancing responsibility to the 
participants with the responsibility to the public, and Baez (2002), in the vein 
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of the critical theorist, points to the ethical dilemma that can arise from keeping 
data obtained through research a secret, when it can expose some social wrong 
and assist emancipation. He further argues that the sanctity of anonymity and 
confidentiality is based upon a liberal humanist ideology, which raises the rights 
of an individual above the rights of the society and the common good, an imbal-
ance that should be redressed, if not by radically abstaining from anonymising 
data, then at least through offering our respondents the option.
Walford (2005) is also among authors who stress the absurdity of pretend-
ing to adhere to these principles, especially in today’s internet age, where informa-
tion is always readily available, and especially when applied to research in small 
groups where they will inevitably be able to make connections and recognise 
each other. And, as de Laine (2000) concludes, even if someone’s anonymity is 
guarded, there is a great chance that the respondents will recognise themselves, 
and however they are portrayed, feel somewhat exploited. Walford (2005) specu-
lates that the potential reason behind insisting upon these principles by default 
is in ensuring access, or perhaps even allowing for spurious generalisations to 
take place, for if conclusions are based on a nameless sample, they can apply to 
everyman. 
As Spicker (2007) points out, in researching policy, the contestation be-
tween public and private is even higher, and if we are to assume that in a de-
mocracy everything is open to public scrutiny, then so are the actions of the 
policy-making elites. However, viewing it in this light implies a level of normative 
judgement and the imagined purpose of one’s research, which I do not necessarily 
share. On a more personal level, however, it is easy to imagine that these elites are 
public figures used to – or expecting to – having their opinion publicised, and 
in my experience, the default expectation among informants was, precisely, that 
their words will be attributed to them, with only certain statements precluded 
with ‘but this is anonymous’. And even without widening the context and refer-
ring to the public identity of the participants, as in the case of elites, there will 
be instances of their simply wishing to maintain ownership of their words and 
their identity, by not becoming rendered nameless and faceless by the researcher. 
Grinyer (2002), for example, paints a rather vivid picture of one such case in 
which a default, anonymising option was applied to accounts of terminal cancer 
patients, most of whom had died by the publication of the study, which is when 
their families realised that a lot of that extremely intimate and harrowing experi-
ence related in the study, had been taken away by their being given pseudonyms.
Perhaps a way to resolve such issues would be to provide the participants 
with as much information about how data will be used and presented, and what 
the purpose of the study is. This however, leads to another highly contested ethi-
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cal issue, that of ‘informed consent’. This problem is one that presents itself in 
both qualitative and quantitative methodology, the problem of, Silverman (2000) 
notes, how much to reveal about research to our participants, so that we feel they 
are giving their ‘informed’ consent, but without ‘contaminating’ the data. In a 
somewhat utilitarian fashion, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) stress that when 
asking this question, and making the decision, it is important to bear in mind the 
end purpose of the choice we are making.
All of the above issues are tackled by resorting to either deontological or 
consequential ethics (Spicker, 2007), the former implying some sort of universal 
ethical standards to be adhered to whenever possible, whilst the latter involves 
varying degrees of what could be best described as situational relativism. Here, 
the logic that is followed is based on the case-to-case personal judgement of the 
researcher(s), but is usually, or at least should be, closely related to their epistemo-
logical position, and the purpose that they imagine their research to have. 
This last point dictates a rather straightforward procedure for the critical 
theorists, for as the emancipation and empowerment of the ‘oppressed’ are the ul-
timate purpose of their work, then most ethical dilemmas are resolved by simply 
keeping this interest as the most dominant. To the critical theorists, any sort of 
scientific detachment is seen as ‘dishonest’ (Lather, 2010). However, what overtly 
political scientists often do not acknowledge, is the relationship of power between 
them and those they consider unaware of their position and in need of liberating 
and pointing in the right way, which critical theorists often assume they hold the 
key to. Lather (2010) is among critical authors who demand political activism for 
research that is hardly ever value free. However, acknowledging and incorporat-
ing personal values in the development of the question, methodology, fieldwork 
and analysis, is not the same as accepting a partisan role for oneself, and it is fair 
to acknowledge the two as separate. Furthermore, not everything can necessarily 
be explained away by employing the categories of race, class, or gender, and to 
do so, in fact, would be to commit an act of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991) 
upon the subjects of research, whom the critical theorists (often unwittingly, it 
seems) condescendingly describe as ‘mystified by ideology’ (Lather, 2010: 193).
Contrary to the critical researchers’ engaged approached and advocacy of 
the intrinsic altruistic value of research, authors like Hammersley (2008) argue 
for a scientific inquiry that does not have a purpose beyond the production of 
knowledge. The fact that education is considered one of the applied social sci-
ences does not pose a problem for his viewpoint. Hammersley does not argue 
that the subsequent instrumentalism applied to this knowledge is impossible or 
even completely inappropriate, but he does demand that whilst it is being con-
ducted, the ultimate purpose of research should be ‘knowledge for knowledge’s 
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sake’. Furthermore, this purpose is important enough for him to suggest a form 
of Machiavellianism in conducting research, i.e. acknowledging the employment 
of ‘less than good means to achieve good ends’, and temporarily suspending not 
only what could be considered universal, but also personal ethical norms and 
values, in producing valuable knowledge (Hammersley and Traianou, 2011). 
Hammersley’s seemingly detached scientific approach clashes with the 
more emotive, feminist approaches, or even Hatch’s (2002) usually value-free 
observation about the relationship of trust and bonding that develops between 
the researcher and the researched, one which is difficult to end without the guilt 
of having taken advantage and abandoned the subjects. In a way, however, Ham-
mersley’s Machiavellian reasoning can be utilised as a way of coping with such 
sentiments, where the researcher finds that both the conceptual design of their 
work and their personal disposition create concerns which would require coping 
in the first place.
The exploitation and benefit - the relationships of power
In his very practical handbook aimed at educational researchers, Hatch (2002) 
shows the greatest ethics-related concern for the issues of reciprocity between the 
researcher and the researched. He seems to take for granted the researcher’s gain 
in this relationship, and never questions the potential risk and harm to this party. 
Instead, he simply asks how the balance could be restored in ensuring that the 
participants, too, benefit from this relationship. Any such arrangement in which 
participation would be rewarded in some material way opens up another set of 
ethical concerns, however, which he never really attempts to explore. 
Some authors argue that the increased ‘democratisation’ of the research 
process, especially post data collection point, might be a way to counter some of 
the impressions of participants’ being ‘taken advantage of ’. For example, Walford 
(2005) argues for a continuous toing and froing between the researcher and the 
respondent, where respondent validation of the researcher’s treatment of the data 
becomes an integral part of the data analysis process, rather than a one-off inci-
dent serving to confirm the researcher’s conclusions. Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007), on the other hand, believe respondent validation to be a contentious 
point, as it can ‘corrupt data’. Some authors go even further and claim that there 
is little reason to believe that respondents should have a privileged status when it 
comes to commenting and analysing their actions (Silverman, 2000). Personally, 
I agree with Scott and Usher (1999) who point out that research which gives a 
highly important place to the rights and responsibilities of participants, is idealis-
15Andragoške studije, 2/2012
tic and rarely practicable, and that most research assumes more of an ‘autocratic’ 
approach. Such concern with the participants view of analysis can lead to highly 
uncomfortable, and not very productive, situations, such as one experienced by a 
feminist researcher, who having sent a draft of her completed study to one of her 
respondents, received a less than happy reaction, as the respondent fiercely and 
emotionally objected to being portrayed (not personally, but as a category in the 
review of the literature) in a highly unfavourable light. And I believe that ‘unfa-
vourable’ to some degree is how a lot of respondents would judge our portrayal 
of them. With the exception of very personal and empathetic approaches and 
portrayals, the very abstraction of someone’s personal experience to a theory or 
a concept, inevitably carries with it a degree of objectification and depersonifica-
tion, with which most participants could find it difficult to agree.
There is another point in the researcher-researched relationship that is 
important to raise here. Most authors who stress issues of emotional and psy-
chological harm implicit in the assumption of ‘exploitation’, fail to extend their 
speculation to the various reasons for which the respondents agree to partake in 
(especially qualitative) research, the simplest and most common of which would 
be the desire to have their voices and stories heard, and pleasure taken in the fact 
that someone considers them worthy of research (Agar, 2008). Barring some ex-
ceptional situations where respondents are young children or the disabled, with 
most qualitative research, the above relationship is one of mutual and reciprocal 
instrumentalism, inherent in most adult relationships.
Arksey and Knight (1999) observe that there are various benefits that the 
participants might gain from the research situation, which can have, if not ex-
actly transformative, then reflective, enlightening, or even a cathartic character. 
Even if I do not entirely subscribe to such collaborative and feminist techniques 
as promoted for example by Kezar (2003) in her reflection on transformative in-
terviews, including with elites, I have certainly experienced numerous instances 
of my respondents’ thinking about a certain issue for perhaps the first time, or 
viewing it in a different light, and commenting on and analysing their actions 
and values as the interview progressed. 
So not only are there decidedly beneficial factors - for participants - in 
research, it is also important to note the harm and risk to the researcher, in an 
ethnographic or an interview-based study, often neglected in discussions about 
power and exploitation. Sometimes it will be precisely the researcher who is ex-
ploited, and possibilities for this range from the interviewee’s hijacking the in-
terview for their purposes, to extorting actual material benefit. The researcher 
may also in some way be harmed through emotionally draining research, or by 
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the inappropriate and offensive behaviour of the participants, which needs to be 
tolerated for research purposes (Arksey and Knight, 1999).
This is not to say that mere reciprocity makes this relationship one of 
equality. It can still be characterised by the power imbalance, and it is precisely 
this imbalance that will raise the most serious ethical concerns, concerns that 
cannot be easily dispelled with forms and regulations. However, it is important 
to stress that how this is dealt with should, apart from personal and professional 
values, also rest on the back of how power is conceptualised and theorised. In my 
own research, for example, I accept the fluidity of power that comes from vari-
ous positioning within a discourse (Cambridge, 2007), and the flexibility of the 
power balance. I also accept that this runs throughout the whole research process, 
starting with the definition of the question, and the research design, all the way 
to the publication process, but is perhaps most immediately and personally felt 
during fieldwork itself, especially if this involves an interview situation. In edu-
cational policy research in particular, Ozga (2011) urges for the power positions, 
relationships and agendas of elite interviewing to be actively considered. 
Power and exploitation in elite interviewing
Policy studies normally involve interviews with past or present policy-makers, 
curriculum developers, and various respondents who are usually recognised as 
‘high-standing’, so interviewing them is referred to as interviewing up (Conti and 
O’Neill, 2007). I disagree with such a view, which somehow implies a fixed, al-
most structuralist (Smith, 2006) balance of power in my respondents’ favour. The 
same notion, only in the opposite direction, would then also apply to non-elite 
interviews, with respondents usually thought of as having ‘less’ power than the 
researcher. Not only that, it also implies that the ‘elite’ attribute assumes the static 
nature of power and its transferability from one context (educational decision-
making) to another (social science research) (ibid.). In reality, with ‘elite’ as well as 
with ‘non-elite’ respondents, a number of factors beginning with the negotiation 
of access, through the immediate context of the interview, to its conduct, will 
affect the change in power and discourse that is produced. Some of these will be 
performed unconsciously on either side, but a lot of them will be a result of the 
conscious use of our cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991). 
Costa and Kiss (2011) offer examples of uncomfortable situations which 
arose from asymmetrical power relations, which are, they claim, a consequence 
of historical, cultural, and institutional context, but are, however, changeable 
over the course of the interview, and are subject to management through good 
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preparation and strong social skills. In addition to the reasons they have stated, 
I believe that some of these uncomfortable situations, and it is certainly the im-
pression I got from some of my interviews, are a consequence of a very conscious 
employment of the cultural or symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991), or control over 
discourse, which creates unequal power relationships. The practical issues sur-
rounding the arrangement of an interview can also fall under this. For example, 
during about a half of my interviews, I felt the swaying of the power balance in 
relation to various situations of last-minute cancellations, last-minute accepting, 
arriving to an empty office since due to my respondent’s last-minute trip abroad 
and their having forgotten to let me know about it, and even one instance of 
‘ambushing’ a respondent at their place of work after their lack of response to my 
countless emails and phone messages, and improvising a quick interview on the 
spot. In fact, I think that even the more technical issues, such as the oft-warned 
about malfunction of the recording device (which I unfortunately experienced on 
one occasion) may affect the management of the flow of power during an inter-
view, as they can signal to the respondent the lack of proper preparation or even 
a lack of a serious, professional approach to the situation. 
Self-presentation, considered in the manner of being used for power bal-
ance management, may also constitute an ethical concern, as it almost inevitably 
involves an element of dishonesty and managing others’ reactions and relation-
ships to oneself. However, this concern can be somewhat assuaged by remember-
ing that respondents, too, have their own expectations and will perform construc-
tions of us based on their experience, so our own agency in this is limited by the 
act of co-constitution of the researcher-researched relationship. Ultimately, it is 
all largely to do with the flexible employment of our (and our respondents’) many 
roles and identities (de Laine, 2000). In my experience, this was adapted to the 
respondent and the immediate context. On occasion, I would engage the persona 
of a ‘researcher’ or a ‘scientist’, when I felt the matter being discussed was some-
what controversial for the respondent, and I thus sought to reassure them that I 
was approaching these matters from a detached, scientific point of view, rather 
than that of a journalist researching a story. My personal political/ideological per-
suasion and maintaining this obscure was another aspect of both creating rapport 
and generating rich data based on my respondents’ assumptions about it, and the 
adjustment of their discourse to suit those assumptions.
Age and gender are further points to be made explicit in relation to self-
presentation. Many authors mention the issue of gender, and Silverman (2000), 
for example points out the sexism inherent in the opinion that ‘only men do 
serious business’ which can create an air of invisibility for female researchers to 
capitalise on. Feminist researchers frequently, sometimes with a hint of guilt, note 
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the value of consciously playing to gender stereotypes (Conti and O’Neill, 2007) 
in the interview situation, particularly with male ‘elites’, and the usefulness of 
‘playing naive’. In my case, being at least half the age of most of my informants, 
could also be employed to this end, when bringing out the persona of a ‘harmless 
student’ helped generate richer data.
Most of what I described does not exclusively apply to elite interviewing, 
and this was partly my intention in arguing the above point regarding the special 
treatment accorded in literature to elite interviewing. The issues of negotiating 
and securing access, revealing the nature of research, and the process of data 
generation with the relationship of power inherent in them, present themselves 
across the spectrum of topics and respondents and in most cases do not merit 
separate discussion. What we are ultimately dealing with most of the time is the 
flow of power in a flexible relationship, which comes as a result of the micro-
political exchange, the use of cultural capital, and the utilisation of various identi-
ties, both by myself as a researcher, and my respondents. Assuming that elites will 
always be the authoritative ones, is something that really needs to be qualified. 
On occasion, and especially when dealing with sensitive issues, it is necessary to 
appreciate the complexity and the emotional impact of the experience for the 
respondents (Neal and McLaughlin, 2009), instead of jumping to the image of 
‘elites’ as public figures offering many-times told official tales.
To me personally, this awareness of the unevenness of the power relation-
ship and the image of ‘elite’ respondents as potentially equally as vulnerable as 
any other respondents (or researchers, for that matter) increased the sense of 
unease and dishonesty in fostering rapport and enabling some participants to 
‘open up’, only to subject their words to a ‘detached’ critical discourse analysis 
later. Unlike Kezar (2003) who, with an emancipating moral purpose in mind, 
speaks rather matter-of-factly about establishing a one-way relationship of trust 
with elite respondents, for the purpose of gathering data and exposing inequali-
ties, my purpose of ‘contributing to knowledge’, and my view of respondents as 
co-constituting that knowledge, has not had enough emotional pull to assuage 
my concerns entirely. Ultimately, what I find reassuring is being able to reflect 
on the moments in which the balance of power was to their advantage, and to 
remember that they voluntarily, and readily, accepted to participate, for a num-
ber of possible reasons. When it comes to the ‘elite’ informants’ motives in being 
studied, Ball (1994) is among authors who recognise that there are a variety of 
reasons for which members of elites agree to participate, which are used to colour 
their representation of the examined events and the construction of their own 
and others’ roles in the events. They can be embittered, disappointed, accusing, 
celebratory, self-justifying, defensive, etc. My experience has recorded an instance 
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or more of all of these. Ozga (2011) also reflects on various agendas of the ‘power-
ful’ and notes how she and her colleague were often conscious of being seen as a 
platform for spreading the former’s ideas and narratives further into the academic 
community. Closely related to this is also the question of the ‘elites’ wanting to 
advertise their participation publicly and wishing their words be attributed. With 
regards to the anonymity issues discussed earlier, and especially in public policy 
research, my solution was to offer my respondents the option of their words being 
attributed to them, as long as this does not impinge on the right and preference 
of other respondents to remain anonymous.
Finally, when speaking of power, it is necessary to note that this issue does 
not disappear – if anything, it becomes perhaps even more acute – once we move 
beyond the fieldwork situation, and into analysis - for every act of classification 
and naming, even in quantitative research, is one of power (Cambridge, 2007). It 
is an attempt to subsume lives and personalities under concepts and categories for 
purposes often not shared with our participants. Schegloff’s (1997) take on this is 
to, rather than impose categories, pay closer attention to the frames of reference 
adopted and used by our respondents, however, this does not solve the problem 
of their further interpretation and abstraction, which, unless it is done in full col-
laboration with respondents, still requires us to apply our frames and concepts, 
dictated by what we imagine the purpose of the project to be.
Conclusion
One point where both the advocates of ‘science for science’s sake’, such as Ham-
mersley, and ‘science for political ends’, such as Kezar, agree, is that not every-
one has the same moral standards, and that what I previously called situational 
relativism seems to be generally acceptable in, and applicable to, most individual 
cases where some sort of a trade-off between ethical norms and research results 
is expected. 
Perhaps the most sensible way to approach ethical issues is to acknowledge 
a degree of relativism and act on a case-to-case basis. The path that we choose 
as social researchers will be affected by numerous factors, including the relative 
values, purpose and significance of research, benefit versus risk to us and our vari-
ous affiliations, including those to our participants. The important thing that will 
make the process feel less covert and dishonest is to remain reflective throughout, 
and make the choices and rationalities in our actions as transparent as possible. 
This, however, should not remain only on the level of what Ball (1994) calls 
‘trivial obsession with behaviour and events in the field’. Although this sort of 
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reflection is important in keeping track of the development of our project and 
accounting for various decisions we have made along the way, it becomes rather 
indulgent and superfluous if it is not theoretically and methodologically justified. 
It is thus necessary to acknowledge that perhaps the greatest ethical implication 
to consider - beyond the very rare personal harm we could induce - is that we are 
creating ‘knowledge’ about others, perpetuating a discourse, drawing conclusions 
which can, despite our disclaimers, be taken with some authority and further 
used in ways unbeknownst to us. It is this responsibility that separates us from 
mere tellers of tales, and commands a level of active self-analysis, or what is in 
Bourdieuian social theory ‘the objectification of the objectifying subject.’
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Konstrukcija i moć:  
Etika proučavanja obrazovnih politika
Apstrakt: Zapadnjačka naučna zajednica poslednjih nekoliko decenija demonstrira izra-
zitu brigu za najviši mogući standard „etičnosti“(Hammersley, 2010) istraživanja u okviru 
društvenih – između ostalog i obrazovnih – nauka. Tačno značenje ove reči je predmet 
debate, kao što je i pitanje da li preterano insistiranje na pravilima i propisima koji se 
tiču etike, zapravo ograničava kvalitet i slobodu naučničkog stvaralaštva. U ovom članku, 
osvrnuću se na najbitnije argumente u ovoj tekućoj raspravi, s posebnim naglaskom na 
pitanja etike i odnosa moći u proučavanju elita, što je tačka koja je često zapostavljena u 
ovakvim diskusijama. U zaključku ću pomenuti sopstveno zapažanje da, kakva god nečija 
pozicija u debati bila, ono što je potrebno da bi se, kako debata, tako i kvalitet istraživanja 
unapredili, jeste veća usmerenost na teorijske i metodološke podloge te pozicije.
Ključne reči: etika, refleksivnost, elitni intervjui, moć. 
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